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Jeff Ferrell, Texas Christian University
As criminologists we face two contemporary crises. The first is the unfolding 
crisis of global capitalism and state governance, and with it the spiraling social harms of 
dislocation, incarceration, impoverishment, and environmental degradation. Amidst these 
spiraling harms will surely emerge, sadly, a further host of phenomena demanding the 
critical attention of criminologists: new forms of acquisitive violence, new crimes attuned 
to economic and existential uncertainty, new moments of down-market corporate 
malfeasance, new strains on social and environmental sustainability, and new patterns of 
state surveillance and control. Perhaps this crisis holds the promise of progressive 
change—but if Marx and Merton were even half right, it most certainly contains the sorts 
of contradictions out of which new forms of crime and predation will emerge.
The second crisis is the crisis of criminology. Criminology is today crippled by its 
own methodology, its potential for analysis and critique lost within a welter of survey 
forms, data sets, and statistical manipulations. Worse, criminology has given itself over to 
a fetishism of these methodologies. Methods such as these are not only widely and 
uncritically utilized by contemporary criminologists—they are detailed and reified to the 
point that, for many criminologists, they have now replaced crime and crime control as 
the de facto subject matter of the discipline. The crisis of criminology doubles back on 
itself; criminology first embraces methods wholly inadequate and inappropriate for the 
study of human affairs, and then makes these methods its message. 
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This second crisis precludes criminology’s progressive engagement with the first. 
Over the past few decades surveys, statistics, and other ‘objective’ methodologies have 
increasingly served to couple criminology to ‘criminal justice’ as both pseudo-discipline 
and state practice. Made the adjunct of criminal justice, criminology not only colludes in 
‘policing the crisis’ and propping up the very institutions that underlie the crisis itself; 
criminology also finds itself pulled away from critical theory and into the realms of 
practical crime control, risk measurement, and data management. This trajectory in turn 
renders most criminological research impenetrable—not to mention off-putting and 
unusable—to everyday citizens, street-level progressive groups, young political activists, 
and others who might enlist criminology’s aid in confronting the contemporary global 
crisis. Married to the criminal justice complex, divorced from the nuanced politics of 
everyday life, criminology narrows its view at the very moment that broader, critical 
criminological engagement is most needed.
As Rome burned, Nero fiddled. As our world conflagrates, criminology calculates.
These intertwined crises—the crisis of global politics, crime, and economy, and 
the crisis of criminology’s methodological inability to engage this global situation
critically—might be addressed in any number of ways. Seminars in advanced statistics or 
survey construction might be summarily emptied out, their participants sent out to 
establish urban gardens or no-cost daycare programs. Criminology as a discipline might 
be declared a failure and a fraud, with its graduate programs and publications reinvented 
as art, or history, or performance studies—or, if present orientations are maintained, 
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actuarial science. Alternatively, criminology could be continued as a discipline, but under 
this ongoing disciplinary cover its scholars could begin holding seminars in revolutionary 
political practice, do-it-yourself media operations, and economic self-sufficiency. 
Dangerous times, after all, require dangerous thinking.
Here, though, I offer a different sort of proposal and provocation for saving 
criminology, and for promoting its critical engagement with the current world crisis.
Kill method.
The Fetishism of the Methodology
‘Fetishism’ generally suggests two sorts of relationships between meaning and the 
material world. The first is the attribution of animating powers to an inanimate object, 
such that the object itself is seen to embody what otherwise might be understood as larger 
forces of human action or cultural practice. Second, and relatedly, is the notion of
fetishism as a sort of unnatural preoccupation with some small dimension of a larger 
totality. For the anthropologist, then, fetishism can be investigated as a form of religious 
mysticism whereby various groups imbue fetish objects with spiritual powers. For 
Marxists, the ‘fetishism of the commodity’ implies not so much mysticism as
mystification—an essential capitalist conceit where commodities are imagined to embody 
value in such a way that the creation of this value through human labor is forgotten. For
the sexual fetishist, the toe or the earlobe emerges as the object of affection, a focused 
substitute for the broader dynamics of sexuality and allure.
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The methodological culture of contemporary criminology operates in just this 
way. Orthodox criminologists imagine that survey research and statistical analysis are 
somehow mystically imbued with the power of ‘objectivity’, that they embody the spirit 
of scientific inquiry, mathematical precision, and dispassionate analysis. They imagine 
that these methods somehow operate independently of human emotion and human 
action—that such methods can drain objective ‘data’ and useful knowledge from those 
who are their targets, can produce results that are valid and ‘replicable’ no matter the 
researcher, can expunge ‘error’ and ‘subjectivity’ from the research process. And like the 
sexual fetishist, orthodox criminologists focus so tightly on the minutiae of their
methodology, and on the social minutiae that their methods are designed to investigate, 
that they regularly forget larger dynamics of crime, transgression, knowledge, and power.
This is of course neither the way criminology must be, nor the way it has always 
been. Historically, many of criminology’s foundational works have emerged from 
idiosyncratic, impressionistic, and ‘undisciplined’ approaches that bear little resemblance 
to any sort of formalized methodology (Adler and Adler, 1998). When in the 1920s and 
1930s Chicago School scholars conducted research, for example, they did so largely 
according to their own sentiments and schedules. The research for Frederic Thrasher’s
(1927: xiii, 79) 571 page book, The Gang, ‘occupied a period of about seven years’, and 
in the book he not only presents in fine detail his impressions of ‘the thrilling street life of 
the gang’, but includes his own in situ photos of gang rituals and juvenile gang life. In 
later decades, researchers associated with the National Deviancy Conference in Great 
Britain (e.g., Young, 1971, Cohen 1972), and American researchers like Howard Becker 
(1963) and Ned Polsky (1967), likewise undertook criminological research that remains 
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at the core of criminology—research that emerged not from pre-set methodologies, but 
from their own marginal lifestyles and (im)moral predilections.
Still, over the past six decades or so—and increasingly in recent decades—
criminology has all but abandoned this tradition of engaged, fluid research for the 
fetishism of the methodology. This trajectory in part began after World War II, with the 
influx of governmental money into academia. “Ample funding, entrepreneurial professors 
and policy-makers thirsting for anything that looked like technical expertise provided a 
combustible mix,” says historian Mark Mazower (2008: 36, 42). “Huge sums of money 
were suddenly pouring into the universities…. The social scientists who got the grants 
offered technical advice that simplified the world and made it governable, using 
behavioral science or mathematical economics models. They turned human affairs into 
data sets, cultural patterns into forms of behavioral response, and they replaced the messy 
multiplicity of words and tongues with the universal and quantifiable language of 
science.” Within sociology, Chapoulie (1996:11) adds, “use of statistical instruments and 
the language of proof of the natural sciences was clearly a way to increase the scientific 
legitimacy of a discipline fully recognized neither in the university nor outside it.’ 
For criminology especially, this tendency has accelerated in recent years with the 
ascension of ‘criminal justice’, the funding imperatives of the National Institute of Justice
and other bureaucracies, and the consequent demand for research that is methodologically 
marketable, politically fundable, and bureaucratically usable for policy makers and 
criminal justice agencies. In this criminological environment of rationalized knowledge 
and pecuniary aspiration, there is little room for research that is impressionistic, 
innovative, and emergent. In this environment, in fact, there is no room for the
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foundational works of criminology. They would be not be funded, not allowed to go 
forward under Institutional Review Board guidelines, not accepted by journal editors for 
publication, not valued by tenure and promotion committees. They would instead be 
dismissed as field reporting, or speculative essay writing, or subjective interpretation, and 
all because of their lack of, well…methodological rigor.
And so, in place of the vivid ethnographies of Thrasher or Becker, in place of the 
innovative theorizing of Merton or Sutherland, what does orthodox criminology today 
offer? Put another way: What sort of discourse is produced by methodological rigor, by a 
criminology addicted to surveys and data sets and statistics? What are the ambient sounds 
of methodological fetishism? The answers aren’t difficult to find; they’re offered up in 
issue after issue of Criminology, the flagship journal of American criminology:
“First, household property crime committed against one’s neighbors has an effect size of 
.132 that is comparable with that of one’s own household victimization (.121)” (Xie and 
McDowall, 2008: 827).
“Recall that a key advantage of the tobit model is that it explicitly deals with the floor-
value of the summative delinquency measure…” (Ousey and Wilcox, 2007: 340).
“A regression coefficient for role differentiation, such as y11,indicates the increase in the 
tendency to be an offender versus a victim, with each unit increase in an explanatory 
variable (X1), which is expressed as the extent to which log odds of offending exceed 
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those of victimization, adjusted for base-rate differences across all items” (Schreck, 
Stewart, and Osgood, 2008: 886). 
“Is the poor performance of MM in part because of the lack of fit with the RC association 
model?” (Wadsworth and Roberts, 2008: 860).
Now it might be argued that these excerpts are here being unfairly made to 
represent and critique the studies from which they are taken, removed as they are from 
the larger substantive or theoretical contexts of the research. In reality, though, it is 
neither the substantive focus nor the theoretical framework that contextualizes this sort of 
criminology; it is the methodology of data manipulation and quantitative analysis. 
Statistical analysis drives and defines this research; as the authors make clear, the 
research stands or falls on measurement and calculation. As exhibited time and again in 
two-page tables, in elaborate mathematical equations that span the printed page, and in 
extended methodological expositions vis-à-vis brief ‘discussion’ or ‘conclusions’ 
sections, this sort of criminological research is primarily designed to construct towering 
statistical edifices—and to build these edifices on the shallowest of data and flimsiest of 
epistemic foundations.
The delinquency research excerpted above, for example, targeted 9,488 Kentucky 
seventh grade students, with less than 4000 of them eventually completing the surveys, 
which in turn offered only limited, pre-set responses to statements like “I talk to my 
mother” and “I can’t seem to stop moving.” In addition, the researchers admit that “our 
sample does seem to under-represent males,” but that “without explicit data on the 
nonresponders, however, we cannot know with any certainty the extent to which they 
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differ from responders” (Ousey and Wilcox, 2007: 322-323, 351-352). In the 2008 
offender/victim study, the researchers acquired from the Sociometrics Corporation data 
from a decade-old (1994-1996) survey of middle school and high school students. 
Despite noting the ambiguity of the survey —such that offending and victimization might 
be confounded within the survey questions themselves (!)—the researchers felt free to 
recode the original ordinal survey data into a yes/no dichotomy, and to “omit the measure 
of ‘gang fighting’ from our list” since “the gang-fighting measure seemed to produce 
greater confusion than clarity…” (Schreck, Stewart, and Osgood, 2008: 871, 881-2). Not 
to be outdone, the authors of the 2008 study on household crime/victimization and 
household mobility utilized decades-old (1980-1985) National Crime Survey data—data 
which excluded mobile homes, “hotels or motels occupied by transient guests,” and 
“group quarters (such as dormitories or rooming houses) because too few observations 
are found to support separate analyses” (Xie and McDowall, 2008: 809, 816-17). 
This is the information—a school kid’s pencil mark in a little response box, a data 
set acquired from the Sociometrics Corporation, a decades-old survey rife with ambiguity 
and omission—that researchers then recode and manipulate to reach quantifiable 
conclusions about crime and crime control. Surveys answered by kids who may or may 
not understand the questions, who may or may not be willing or able to translate their 
memories onto coded answer sets, who may or may not represent those other kids not 
answering the survey; surveys then collated, stored away, and later salvaged for still more 
recoding and reinterpretation; these recordings then recoded again into charts, tables, and 
equations—this is imagined to constitute knowledge of crime and delinquency, and 
conclusions as to its causes and consequences? How immeasurably far is this 
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methodology of measurement from the lived experience of crime and victimization, and 
from criminologists’ deep understanding of that experience?
Build thee more stately mansions, oh my soul (Holmes, 1858)—but not from 
numbers dense as bricks, and not on foundations of epistemic fraud.
At times, the foundations of epistemic fraud are even layered one on top of the 
other. As administered by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), the National Youth Gang Survey allegedly measures 
the number of gangs and gang members nationwide, and tracks significant trends in youth 
gang characteristics and activities—and, indeed, official reports based on the survey are 
suffused with summative tables, charts, figures, and formulae. To acquire this statistical 
and longitudinal knowledge, though, the OJJDP mails its surveys not to gang members or 
community researchers, but only to law enforcement agencies.  Whoever might be 
assigned the task of completing the survey at each agency is then instructed to answer 
survey questions based on ‘records or personal knowledge’, though it is ‘impossible to 
determine which’—and further, ‘no definition [is] presented regarding what constitutes a 
gang member or a gang incident,’ since ‘little agreement has been reached on what 
constitutes a gang, gang member, or gang incident…’ (OJJDP, 1999: 7). In this way, the 
OJJDP’s methodology generates official criminological knowledge of a critical crime 
issue—gangs, gang members, and gang activities—that can perhaps best be summarized 
as follows:  “That which is not to be studied directly can nonetheless be surveyed 
definitively, based on the records, or perhaps the personal perceptions, of those whose job 
it is to eradicate that which they cannot define accurately” (Ferrell, Hayward, and Young, 
2008: 174).
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Of course this is all laughably absurd, unless your job is to believe its not—that is, 
unless your job hinges on a politically expedient methodological fetish for figures and 
formulae in place of on-the-ground criminological knowledge. And by the way: What if 
your job is, in addition, to induce masturbation among college students? In his 2006 
Sutherland Address to the American Society of Criminology, Professor of Public Policy 
and Statistics Daniel Nagin (2007: 265) outlined a recent clinical experiment in which 
male undergraduates were “instructed to masturbate but not to the point of ejaculation 
while responding to a series of sex-related questions.” Citing this study as ‘the type of 
research on decision making that I believe will illuminate important issues in 
criminology” and help in “moving choice to center stage in criminological theory and 
empirical research,” Nagin (2007: 262, 266, 269) went on to raise an interesting 
methodological issue. “Tests of wide-ranging theories,” he noted, “often rely on survey 
data in which people respond in a ‘cool’, non-aroused state….” Yet the masturbatory 
experiment “suggests that responses in a cool state to choice relevant considerations, such 
as moral judgments and social attachments, may provide very poor measurements of that 
factor in the aroused emotional states that commonly accompany criminal behavior.”
Putting aside the question of what Nagin himself might actually know about the 
“emotional states” of either survey respondents or criminals, his comments nonetheless 
offer a telling insider critique of criminology’s fetishized methodologies. Even a 
criminologists who is a professor of statistics and author of more than one article on 
“semiparametric mixed Poisson models,” even a criminologist comfortable with the 
forced artificiality of clinical trials and controlled masturbation, can’t help asking a
foundational question of the statistically manipulated survey data that orthodox 
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criminologists use to test theory and to measure crime: What emotional connection do
such data have to the reality of crime and victimization? Not only is such ‘data’
profoundly suspect in terms of clarity, perception, memory, and knowledge–it is likely 
emanating from the wrong emotional register as well. 
Nagin and his clinical masturbators confirm the masturbatory fetish that is 
orthodox criminological methodology. Against all logic, orthodox criminologists attribute 
to their survey data and statistical summaries powers that are in fact not present: 
precision, insight, and objective evaluation. Like other fetishists, they in turn focus on 
these fetish objects with a sort of unnatural intensity, obsessively turning them over in 
their minds and in their computers, and so forgetting the world beyond answer sets and 
data sheets. And indeed all of this is mostly masturbatory—mostly for the pleasure of a 
small circle of journal editors, tenure committees, and governmental operatives—and 
mostly unusable in that big and increasingly dangerous world beyond academic careerism 
and bureaucratic policymaking.
Criminology, and that big world beyond, would be better off without it.
Alternative…Method?
An alternative to all this—an alternative that can perhaps foster criminology’s 
critical engagement with the contemporary world and its crises—has already been 
glimpsed: the tradition of deeply engaged, impressionistic ethnographic field work, as 
practiced by early Chicago School researchers, later generations of qualitative 
methodologists, and a few criminologists today. Yet even here, the debilitating effects of 
fetishism remain a danger. In the decades since Thrasher and Becker, ethnographic 
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research has often been characterized as a sort of thoroughgoing, self-contained 
alternative methodology, a carefully calibrated counterweight to the methods of survey 
and statistic. This reification of qualitative method in part reflects a tendency that 
philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend (1975) has identified: the tendency to imagine, 
post hoc, that earlier disciplinary work must surely have anticipated the discipline today, 
and so to assign to it a rationality and teleological certainty that it never had. This 
totalizing sense of ethnographic field research derives also, ironically, from the 
disciplinary stigma with which ethnographic researchers are currently saddled; like Al 
Cohen’s (1955) delinquent boys, ethnographers well know that the measuring rod of 
orthodox criminology finds them lacking, and so they invert it, and claim instead that 
ethnography constitutes the real standard of rigorous method. For still other qualitative 
researchers, disciplinary stigma induces not inversion by imitation—a hope that if 
qualitative research can somehow be made to seem more like quantitative research, can 
be more infused with scientific schemata and self-avowed validity, then it might be made 
legitimate. 
For a variety of historical and disciplinary reasons, then, ethnography risks 
becoming just another methodological fetish, just another chapter in the methods 
textbooks, just one more set of deployable research procedures deserving of endless 
reification, refinement, and discussion. Yet as all good ethnographers know—though 
won’t always put into print, for reasons of disciplinary survival—the field researcher’s 
deep engagement with subjects and settings renders any preordained methodological 
prescriptions provisional at best. Ethnographic research techniques are in reality not 
deployed; they are negotiated with subjects of study, invented or reinvented on the spot, 
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and not infrequently discarded in the dangerous, ambiguous, interactive process of field 
research (Ferrell and Hamm, 1998). “OLS regression” may be a technique of statistical 
analysis, and “taking good field notes” a technique of ethnography—but where the first 
follows procedural protocols for manipulating data, the second follows the uncertain 
rhythms of human interaction beneath bridges, in back alleys, and inside courtrooms. 
Methods textbooks and graduate qualitative research seminars aside, viable ethnography 
remains closer to the “impressionistic, humanistic, and artistic” (Adler and Adler, 1998: 
xii) undertakings of Becker (1963), swinging high with jazz musicians, or Polsky (1967),
hustling his way through seedy pool halls, than it does the formalized methodologies of 
survey research or clinical experimentation.
With the emergence of postmodern and reflexive/auto-ethnographic orientations 
over the past couple of decades, at least some researchers and theorists now embrace this 
admission that ethnography is by nature a fluid and idiosyncratic undertaking. In this 
context there is among some scholars increasing acknowledgement—even celebration—
of ethnography as an enterprise distinctly and inherently different from the abstract
rigidity of social ‘scientific’ method. This sense of fluidity and openness applies to the 
subject of ethnographic research as well; where it was once imagined that rigorous 
ethnography could capture the totality of a clearly delineated group or setting, many 
researchers now speak of ethnographic research as an uncertain process attuned to the 
parallel uncertainty of contemporary groups and their circumstances. Contrasting the 
tradition of “technique-driven” social science research with postmodern notions of 
fluidity and ambiguity, Peter Manning (1995: 246) argues that these notions can usefully 
orient ethnography to the ‘emergent, fragile, and reflexive character of modern life….”
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology, Vol 1 (1) 2009
14
Ethnographies of such circumstances, Manning (1995: 249-251, emphasis in original) 
notes, can in turn account for the “fundamental perversity and unpredictability of human 
conduct” by gathering “fragments and shards of events” into an open-ended 
“ethnography of experience”. Unpredictability, fragility, fragmentation—all constitute a 
refreshing counter to any fetishizing of ethnography as a magical set of technical 
maneuvers. 
Along with revitalizing ethnographic research in general, the emergence of 
cultural criminology has likewise spawned a certain reimagining of ethnographic 
practice. In their recently published Cultural Criminology: An Invitation, for example, 
Ferrell, Hayward and Young (2008) outline two sorts of ethnography emerging within 
cultural criminology, and in response to the swirling possibilities of late, liquid modernity 
(Bauman, 2000). Instant ethnography denotes an ethnography of moments and ephemeral 
meanings and in so doing confronts yet another conventional assumption underlying the 
sense of ethnographic method as a totalizing enterprise: the notion that durable social 
groups and situations are to be studied through enduring ethnographic research. Echoing 
Katz’s (1988) conceptualization of crime’s situational seductions, and Lyng (1990, 2005) 
and Ferrell’s (1996, 2005) work on illicit moments of edgework and adrenalin, instant 
ethnography suggests documenting not groups or organizations, but instead the situated 
moments in which crime and crime control are negotiated. It further implies that the 
ethnographer must become part of those negotiations, must go “inside the immediacy of 
crime” (Ferrell, 1997), inside instants so fleeting and fragile that those involved often 
believe them to be both ephemeral and ineffable (Ferrell, Milovanovic, and Lyng, 2001).
In this way, instant ethnography also becomes an ethnography of the performances 
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(Conquergood, 2002, Garot, 2007) whereby gang members, police officers, or victims 
construct and affirm their identities.
Liquid ethnography likewise suggests a useful destabilization of ethnographic 
“method,” and of the boundary separating researcher from research subjects. Liquid 
ethnography is the ethnography of populations cut loose from stabilities of time and 
space through global immigration, short-term employment, and virtual communications; 
it is ethnography attuned less to durable affiliations than to transitory allegiances. Further, 
liquid ethnography flows with the shifting interplay of images in media-saturated 
environments, and with the interplay of ethnographer, ethnographic subjects, and social 
activism that animates the best of field research. Ferrell’s (2006: 1) recent mixing of 
“field research and free form survival” as an unemployed urban scrounger might 
constitute one example. The research of David Brotherton, Luis Barrios, and their 
associates certainly constitutes another (Brotherton and Barrios, 2004, 2009). Through 
this engaged research they document the ongoing political interplay of “street gangs,” 
U.S. immigration policy, street-level organizing, and global activism—all while 
critiquing conventional images of gangs and incorporating alternative visual 
representations. Similarly, Maggie O’Neill (2004: 220) and her associates utilize 
“participatory action research,” “performative praxis,” and various forms of art and 
photography in their collaborative work with prostitutes, immigrants, asylum seekers and 
other marginalized populations, thereby inventing forms of field work that can affiliate 
the researcher with even the most transitory and contingent of communities.
If the lived practice of ethnographic field research moves criminology away from 
“method” as a set of deployable protocols and techniques, these recent 
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reconceptualizations push it away further still. Blurring researcher and research setting, 
confounding engaged research with political engagement, destabilizing both the temporal 
and spatial frames of the research process, they harbinger the death of method itself. They 
suggest that ethnography, rather than existing as a “method” of research, in fact operates 
most usefully as a sensibility about the external world and a sensitivity to its nuanced 
ambiguities. This ethnographic sensibility orients the criminologist to the ongoing, 
symbolic construction of meaning, and to the shared emotional environments in which 
such meaning is made—all while promoting a research sensitivity of openness, 
attentiveness, and epistemic humility. Conceptualizing ethnography as intertwined with 
performance and persuasion in turn repositions it as part of a larger goal: the 
ethnographer’s ultimate goal of communicating with others—readers, viewers, 
community members—in the interest of humanistic engagement and progressive social 
change. As experienced by ethnographers themselves and as embodied in new 
orientations toward instant inquiry and liquid research, ethnography disappears as a 
method and reemerges as a way of living and being in the world, more ontological 
orientation than methodological technique. 
One further reorientation surely applies the coup de grace to any fetishism of the 
methodology, to any lingering belief that control groups and carefully quantified data 
sets—or for that matter, pre-ordained techniques of ethnographic research—constitute 
appropriate avenues to criminological understanding. Simply put, this reorientation 
involves acknowledging that, more times than most anyone cares to admit, good research 
constitutes what we might call a “gorgeous mistake” (O’Connor and Pirroni, 1990). 
Ethnographer Stephanie Kane (1998: 142-43), for example, echoes Manning’s sense of 
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the “fundamental perversity and unpredictability of human conduct” in arguing that 
chaotic “moments of extreme or unusual conditions” often offer invaluable insights into 
social situations. As such, she adds, mistakes and misdirections in research, moments of 
stumbling serendipity, are to be valued—maybe even sought—for their criminological 
insights. No less a criminologist (and sociologist of science) than Robert K. Merton (in 
Cullen and Messner, 2007: 6) likewise notes the “differences between the finished 
versions of scientific works as they appear in print and the actual course of inquiry…. 
Typically, the scientific paper or monograph presents an immaculate appearance which 
reproduces little or nothing of the intuitive leaps, false starts, mistakes, loose ends, and 
happy accidents that actually cluttered up the inquiry.” And then there are Kandinsky, 
Man Ray, Duchamp, Rauschenberg, Pollock, and de Kooning, all artists whose 
breakthrough works, we now know, emerged out of mistakes and misperceptions, out of 
cracked printing presses and broken picture tubes—though as art critic Carter Ratcliff 
says, “it wasn’t part of the way they presented themselves to acknowledge this” (in 
Lovelace, 1996: 119).  
Kill method indeed—these examples suggest, as does Feyerabend (1975) in his 
critical history of modern science that “method,” and those who fetishize it as a safeguard
against error and subjectivity, regularly ignore insight and inhibit creativity. The failure 
of method, it turns out, may often be the best method (Ferrell, 2004, 2009). Or as the 
anonymous punk petty thief author of the book Evasion (2003:12) put it, “I always 
secretly looked forward to nothing going as planned. That way, I wasn’t limited by my 
imagination.  That way anything can, and always did, happen.”
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Coda, as Performed by the Schwarze Kapelle
Then again, sometimes when nothing goes as planned, you end up in prison. 
During World War II a group of German citizens, diplomats, and military officers 
decided that the only hope for Germany, and for the world, was to depose Hitler, through 
assassination if necessary. The Gestapo’s name for this informal group was the Schwarze 
Kapelle—the Black Orchestra—and among them was the brilliant German theologian 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Through a series of unlucky accidents their plan to kill Hitler failed, 
though, and members of the group were rounded up, imprisoned, tortured, and murdered. 
Even after his capture, sitting in his prison cell, awaiting execution, Bonhoeffer 
(1972: 280) didn’t doubt his commitment to the plan—but he did began to reconsider the 
nature of religion, faith, and existence. In a letter to his friend Eberhard Bethge, he wrote 
that perhaps religion was only “a historically conditioned and transient form of human 
self-expression,” not to be confused with Christianity itself. And so he asked Bethge a 
question: “If religion is only a garment of Christianity—and even the garment has looked 
very different at different times—then what is religionless Chistianity?” 
Nothing on the order of life and death at stake in this essay; no theological 
considerations either. But still, the parallel appeals. Sitting in the intellectual prison that is 
orthodox criminology today, one can’t help but wonder: Is “method” only a garment of 
criminology, a transient construction, and not to be confused with the criminological 
imagination itself? And if so, what might criminology become without it?
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